554K views · Feb 15, 2018 · 12:24 · 1 HN recommender · 4 mentions · discussed 2021–2025
Dr Mike Pound explains the suspected backdoor in the Dual_EC_DRBG random number generator and how elliptic curve constants could let someone predict its output.
Why Hacker News points people here: HN points to it as an intuitive explanation of how NIST standardized a backdoored generator.
“He also gives a super cool/intuitive breakdown on how this came to be.”HN comment, 2025
“He also gives a super cool/intuitive breakdown on how this came to be.”
Intuitive breakdown of how NIST standardized backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG
I recommend this video by Computerphile - He talks about how NIST may have been pressured into enforcing compromised (backdoored?) cryptography methods as a standard - Dual_EC_DRBG to be exact. He also gives a super cool/intuitive breakdown on how this came to be. It will definitely grow some food for thought. this video
“Computerphile[1] did a video about the specifics of the backdoor in Dual EC DRBG.”
Explains the backdoor mechanism in Dual EC DRBG
Computerphile[1] did a video about the specifics of the backdoor in Dual EC DRBG. As i understand it, the hackers replaced a magic number Q with a different value than the standards compliant one, where they had pre-computed P. [1]: this video
“there are some possibilities that's makes it plausible”
Explains plausibility of the Dual EC backdoor
Long story short is that we don't know for sure, but there are some possibilities that's makes it plausible this video
“Computerphile video discussing the mathematics around how such a number could have been used in a practical way.”
Math of how such a number could be used practically
Computerphile video discussing the mathematics around how such a number could have been used in a practical way. this video link When people say, “Don’t roll your own crypto,” it’s because the field is littered with footguns and (to stretch an analogy) guns in cryptography launch explosives.
