21K views · Feb 14, 2019 · 45:38 · 6 HN recommenders · 6 mentions · discussed 2019–2024
Andrew "bunnie" Huang examines how realistic hardware supply chain attacks are, from rogue insiders to nation states, in the wake of the Bloomberg Businessweek report. He explains how undocumented components could be hidden on boards and how hard they are to spot.
Why Hacker News points people here: HN people point to it as the sober, technically grounded picture of hardware supply chain security, and an eye-opening one.
“This is an eye opening talk in the subject”HN comment, 2023
“This is an eye opening talk in the subject”
Eye-opening talk on how hard hardware supply chain attacks are to spot.
It would really need to go further than that. Supply chain attacks at the hardware level are very difficult to spot, especially at scale. This is an eye opening talk in the subject: this video
“Watch this”
Argues hardware supply chain attacks are plausible.
Hey, folks thought Echelon was a joke in the 90's until Snowden showed that Echelon is child's play. The Big Hack might be true or not, but it's not far fetched. There might be more at play here. Watch this this video
“I found Bunnie Huang's talk on supply chain security a reasonable picture of the issues underlying the Bloomberg story.”
Reasonable picture of the issues underlying the Bloomberg story.
I found Bunnie Huang's talk on supply chain security a reasonable picture of the issues underlying the Bloomberg story. this video With the caveat that I find Bunnie Huang credible. link
“For a good discussion of this topic, I recommend Andrew "bunnie" Huang's talk about supply chain security”
Good discussion of hardware tampering during manufacturing.
Bribing Intel employees is probably expensive and might have legal risks. Instead, just hire one of the many skilled technicians in Shenzhen. For a good discussion of this topic, I recommend Andrew "bunnie" Huang's talk about supply chain security: this video
“There's a fun talk that goes over a lot of them here”
Covers many techniques for hiding undocumented components on boards.
>when one would simply need a microscope to find them in devices This isn't a true statement, if strictly read--there are many techniques to hide undocumented components on boards, and covering all of them requires more than just a pass under a SEM. There's a fun talk that goes over a lot of them here: this video
“there is a great talk by Andrew "bunnie" Huang on hardware supply chain security”
Related great talk on hardware supply chain security.
Somewhat related, but there is a great talk by Andrew "bunnie" Huang on hardware supply chain security: this video
