749K views · Feb 21, 2008 · 5:22 · 1 HN recommender · 4 mentions · discussed 2011–2020
A short Princeton CITP video describing cold boot attacks, where encryption keys remain in DRAM after power loss and can be recovered. It covers the attack against disk encryption such as BitLocker, FileVault and TrueCrypt.
Why Hacker News points people here: It is linked as the original short demonstration that keys can be pulled from RAM after shutdown.
“is a well-made 5-minute introduction by the authors.”HN comment, 2011
“is a well-made 5-minute introduction by the authors.”
Short intro by the authors to recovering encryption keys from memory.
Indeed, the encryption keys can be recovered from memory fairly easily. link is very readable; this video is a well-made 5-minute introduction by the authors.
“You may be interested in [1] and [2].”
Backs up the claim that RAM freezing can recover keys.
2. "with the cryogenic RAM freezing technique, presumably" - errr, no. With the "sit down at the computer and turn off the encryption/copy the data to an external drive technique", I think you'll find. Obvious bullsh*t to anyone technical but sounds 'cool' to your average 14yr old who reads these sort of sites. Errr, actually yes. You may be interested in [1] and [2]. [1] link [2] this video
“the original cold boot video”
Shows the timing limits of cold boot attacks.
You're right, I think an attack could be possible on some computers if the agents act very quickly. I don't think 30 minutes would be possible though, judging from what is said and shown in the original cold boot video: this video
“For getting encryption keys from RAM after shutdown there's this video”
Shows retrieving encryption keys from RAM after shutdown.
For getting encryption keys from RAM after shutdown there's this video mentioned by another commentor: this video For using reflections, there's this paper implementing reading screen content from various things like reading glasses, a can of coke or even the user's eye (including a discussion of limitations): link Right now I can't find something on reading keyboard vibrations with lasers, but here's one doing it acoustically and one doing it via acclerometer of a phone on the table: link link
